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SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT, PART II 
SHOULD WE ADOPT A ―WHAT WORKS‖ APPROACH IN LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT? 
             Mariana Prado* 
 
My comments will be mostly connected to Tom’s third question, relat-
ing to the future,1 and I would like to start by responding to Salil Mehra.2  I 
generally agree that there is an excessive focus on replicable ―tools‖ and 
―best practices‖ in Law and Development studies, but I think there are a lot 
of questions to be asked regarding Mehra’s suggestion that the way forward 
involves addressing embedded cultural practices and institutions.  In fact, 
there are currently a number of scholars (myself included) emphasizing the 
importance of looking at the interaction between so-called informal institu-
tions (such as cultural practices, social norms, and historically entrenched 
attitudes and values).  The problem is that although most of these analyses 
are very helpful in understanding what went wrong and why the ―toolkit‖ 
did not work in a given context, they do not tell us how to improve our ef-
forts going forward.  So, like the ―blueprint‖ Law and Development scho-
lars, the ―context matters‖ Law and Development scholars are not helping 
the field move forward. 
The problem becomes even more pressing when we move out of spe-
cific legal fields, such as best practices for antitrust or telecommunications 
regulators, to something like the rule of law.  There seems to be some palp-
able and measurable outcome in the former (for example, we can assess 
whether the telecommunications sector is operating with lower rates or 
greater competition), but not in the latter.  Brian Tamanaha argues that this 
explains why rule of law projects continue to receive generous financial 
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The ―rule of law‖ is intangible and cannot be pointed at like 
a broken factory. . . .  [T]he rule of law has no blueprint, no 
standard structure, and is not something that can be con-
structed on demand.  There is no timetable . . . .  Judgments 
about the value and effectiveness of rule of law projects 
thus can be postponed indefinitely.3 
 
One could argue that measuring success in the fields of antitrust and 
telecommunications regulation also presents difficulties.  As Daniel Sokol 
suggests in his contribution to this Symposium, we can always ask if rates 
could have gone even lower than they did, or if the benefits of regulatory 
reforms could have been better distributed among society.4  Indeed, such 
questions make it hard to define what constitutes success in antitrust and 
telecommunications regulation.  Those issues notwithstanding, in these 
fields there does seem to be a threshold line between failures and non-
failures.  There are outcomes (such as efficiency, prices, and competition) 
that allow us to assess whether reforms improved—at least in some re-
spect—the utility services provision, or if regulation had any impact on 
market structures.  In other words, although it might still be hard to define 
absolute success, it seems easier to identify a ―broken factory‖ in these sec-
tors than in rule of law reforms. 
Katharina Pistor tries to tackle the lack-of-measurable-outcomes prob-
lem in rule of law reforms by suggesting that we should identify our ends 
(and reject the idea that rule of law is an end in and of itself) and ―begin to 
disentangle the relation between specific legal reform efforts and [ ] social 
and economic indicators . . . .‖5  In other words, she suggests a ―what 
works‖ approach.  This seems like a healthy shift of focus, because it allows 
us to consider alternative legal and institutional arrangements, avoiding the 
―toolkit‖ approach.  Also, defining our ends seems to be what was missing 
in the idea that ―context and difference matters‖: by knowing what we are 
trying to achieve, it will be easier to search for successful examples and 
change or adapt them to devise similar solutions in other contexts.  Reco-
vering a bit of Tamanaha’s 1995 optimism, ―the end result may be the 
achievement around the world of successful, indigenous permutations of the 
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There are a number of issues, however, that need to be considered be-
fore we follow this path.  First, although the ―what works‖ approach might 
open our eyes (and minds) to ingenious solutions developed by insiders and 
locals, it can also quickly turn into a race around the world, wherein legal 
reformers try to find innovative solutions to replicate elsewhere.  The expe-
rience of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil,7 seems to be a 
clear example: when replicated in other Brazilian cities and throughout Lat-
in America, it did not always work as well as it did originally.8  This trans-
fer-failure routine will not happen if we ―disentangle the relationship 
between specific legal reform efforts and [ ] social and economic indica-
tors,‖ but until that happens, there could be a strong temptation to simply 
replicate successes. 
Second, the ―what works‖ approach can create an obsession with social 
and economic indicators that might generate the wrong incentives for de-
veloping countries.  For instance, those who do not want reforms to happen 
might manipulate the numbers.  Such practices might become even more 
pernicious if these indicators become the measurement used to determine if 
developing countries should receive loans, garner support for rule of law re-
forms, or attract foreign direct investment. 
Third, I take Katharina Pistor9 and Daniel Kaufmann’s10 point about the 
gap between law in the books and law in reality, but there is a conceptual 
question about ends and means here.  How much can we tell our ends and 
means apart when we are concerned, for instance, with the issues raised by 
Katharina Pistor: discrimination and the status of women in society?  Are 
women’s rights just a means to reach equality, or an end in itself?  Can we 
set up a linear path in which we say that women’s rights is a means and de 
facto equality is an end, or is it the case that the concern with de facto 
equality is embedded in the idea that there is an effective legal system to 
protect women’s rights when necessary?  Sometimes it might not be clear 
what the end point looks like. 
Fourth, the ―what works‖ approach may create the temptation to adopt 
shortcuts to achieve immediate ends or goals, without necessarily consider-
ing the broader institutional implications of these strategies.  One example 
is investment treaty arbitration (ITA).  As Susan Franck shows, there is a 
great deal of empirical evidence that allows for a cautioned optimism about 
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may use ITAs because they want to avoid corrupt judiciaries or do not want 
to rely on a dysfunctional and inefficient court system.  If this is the case, 
then the availability of ITAs will eliminate some of the political pressure 
that could mobilize powerful interest groups to press for judicial reforms.  
Thus, the goal of solving disputes and attracting investments needs to be 
considered within context; these benefits may bring with them a risk of re-
duced judicial reform, a reform that could benefit not only investors, but al-
so the population at large. 
Finally, if the ―what works‖ approach becomes predominant among 
Law and Development institutions, what is the role that scholars can and 
should play?  On the one hand, they can ―engage with the projects while 
providing serious scholarly analysis and critique,‖ as John Ohnesorge sug-
gests, in an attempt to avoid the abovementioned problems.12  On the other 
hand, there is always the risk that ―toolkit‖ people will misappropriate any 
scholarly critical work, exacerbating the problems noted above.  A careful 
analysis disentangling the relationship between specific legal reform efforts 
and well-identified social and economic indicators, for example, can always 
be misread as suggesting an empty emphasis on social and economic indi-
cators.  The same analysis, focusing on one specific case of successful legal 
innovation, can be misused as a suggestion that this particular experience 
should be transplanted into other contexts.  In sum, ―toolkit‖ people can al-
ways convert a scalpel into an axe.  The question, then, is whether scholars 
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INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND LAW & DEVELOPMENT 
Susan D. Franck* 
 
Tom Ginsburg’s initial post raises a series of fascinating questions 
about the future of Law and Development.  These questions encourage us to 
think about the utility of different methodological approaches, basic defini-
tions, and the implications for institutional change.  Investment treaty arbi-
tration (ITA)—which gives foreign investors the right to arbitrate directly 
against a host government for arguable violations of their substantive in-
vestment right—provides a unique opportunity to explore these issues in a 
tangible manner.  So I beg your indulgence as I reflect upon a specific ap-
plication (namely, ITA) to highlight some of the themes raised by my fel-
low bloggers. 
As the legitimacy of ITA becomes a matter of heated debate, who wins 
the dispute has become a matter of particular interest.  Suggesting that ITA 
is unfairly tilted toward the developed world, various countries have with-
drawn from World Bank dispute resolution bodies or are considering the 
elimination of arbitration.13  Rather than relying on anecdotal evidence, 
supposition, or political rhetoric, it is vital to provide systematic data to aid 
stakeholders in the assessment of the ITA process and consider the implica-
tions for international development.  Ideally, a mixed-methods approach 
that both (1) capitalizes on the strengths of the individualized, sociological, 
and qualitative approaches advocated by Katharina Pistor14 and John Ohne-
sorge,15 and (2) contextualizes specific experiences within the framework of 
a larger puzzle offered by broader quantitative research, could provide par-
ticularly useful insights.16  Given the availability of data from public arbitra-
tion awards, this Essay focuses upon quantitative aspects of a mixed-
methods approach. 
Previous research has shown that although both investors and govern-
ments won investment treaty arbitration cases, the respondent states were 
more likely than investors to win (57.7% for states as compared with a 
38.5% win rate for investors).  In cases where there was a violation of the 
underlying international investment agreement (IIA), tribunals awarded 
amounts that were smaller than what investors claimed.  More particularly, 
while investors claimed an average of $343 million in damages, the average 
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won, and when investors did win, they usually received far less than they 
originally claimed.17 
The open question was whether the outcomes reported were somehow 
related to variables such as the parties’ or arbitrators’ development back-
ground.  Finding the answer to this question raises an issue echoed by John 
Cioffi, namely that ―large-n quantitative analyses of law related variables  
. . . [are] deeply problematic‖ when ―these studies lump together highly de-
veloped countries‖ and developing countries.18  Given the possible disparate 
impact on the developing world, it is critical that research consider the dif-
ference in outcomes between these two groups.  If outcome is reliably asso-
ciated with—let alone causally influenced by—the development 
background of the respondent state or presiding arbitrator, serious questions 
about the integrity of ITA could arise. 
But even recognizing the difference between developed and develop-
ing countries raises a question: what is ―development status‖?  In the con-
text of quantitative research, operationalizing terms properly and 
establishing measurement validity is one of the thorniest issues.  ―Devel-
opment status‖ can mean different things to different people in different 
contexts.  In order to benefit from standard terms and begin the process of 
creating more nuanced analysis, my own research started by using pre-
existing measures and categories for defining development.  In particular, 
the research considered ―development status‖ in two ways, namely by ana-
lyzing categories, including: (1) membership in the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and (2) World Bank 
classification as a High Income, Upper-Middle Income, Low-Middle In-
come, or Low Income country.19 
Although this was a relatively straightforward metric for defining the 
development status of respondent states, defining the ―development status‖ 
of arbitrators was more difficult.  Arbitrators’ development status might 
have been measured in various ways, including pure nationality of origin, 
country of residence, country of legal training, number of advanced de-
grees, membership in professional organizations, average annual income, or 
some combination thereof.  For the purposes of this initial, limited study, 
development status for arbitrators was defined as a function of arbitrator na-
tionality, in part because of the historical focus upon arbitrator nationality 
and the belief that nationality is a proxy for adjudicative neutrality.20  A pre-
siding arbitrator’s status was, therefore, measured by considering the OECD 
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Bearing in mind how ―development‖ was operationalized in this re-
search, and recognizing that different constructions may require different 
methodological approaches and definitions, the newest generation of re-
search considered whether there was a reliable statistical link between de-
velopment status and ITA outcome.21  One study considered only the impact 
of a respondent’s development status on outcome.  The results of statistical 
analyses demonstrated that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between a government’s development background and the outcome of 
ITA.22 
A second study considered the relationship among outcome, the devel-
opment status of the respondent state, and the development status of the 
presiding arbitrator’s country of origin.  The results generally showed that 
outcome was not reliably associated with the development status of the res-
pondent, the development status of the presiding arbitrator, or some interac-
tion between those two variables.  This lack of relationship held true for 
both: (1) winning or losing investment treaty arbitration, and (2) amounts 
tribunals awarded against governments.23  There were, however, two statis-
tically significant simple effects—found in one sub-set of potentially non-
representative cases24—that suggested tribunals with presiding arbitrators 
from Middle Income countries awarded different damages in cases against 
High Income countries. Specifically, if the presiding arbitrator was from a 
Middle Income country, High Income countries received statistically lower 
awards than either: (1) Upper-Middle Income respondents, or (2) Low In-
come respondents.  Awards by Middle Income presiding arbitrators for 
High Income and Lower-Middle Income respondents were statistically 
equivalent.25 
The overall results cast doubt on the arguments that: (1) ITA is the 
equivalent of tossing a two-headed coin to decide disputes, (2) the develop-
ing world is treated unfairly in ITA, and (3) arbitrators from the developed 
and developing world decide cases differently.  The evidence creates a basis 
for cautious optimism about the integrity of ITA and suggests radical over-
haul, rejection, or rebalancing of procedural rights in International Invest-
ment Agreements (IIAs) is not necessarily warranted.  Although the follow-
up tests and limitations of the data suggest optimism must be tempered 
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address particularized problems and enacting targeted reforms to redress 
perceived concerns about the international investment regime. 
In the context of ITA, Salil Mehra’s point that the ―way forward for 
Law and Development [ ] involves embracing and addressing differences 
rather than seeking a universal solvent‖26 buttresses this need for individua-
lized solutions.  Individualized solutions, in turn, may help address the con-
cerns raised by Mariana Prado.  It suggests that scholars can and should 
play a vital role in the Law and Development debate.  Part of that role could 
be encouraging the discourse to move beyond a dichotomy polarized by 
―unilateral blueprint‖ versus ―context matters‖ models.27  In the context of 
the resolution of international investment disputes, this means encouraging 
scholars to: develop methodological insights that operate on multiple levels, 
consider different definitions of terms like ―development,‖ recognize the 
limitations of inferences based upon specific methods and definitions, pro-
vide interpretive guidance about the policy implications, and—in light of 
those points—develop theories, subject to the research loop, that respect 
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LAW & DEVELOPMENT: PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT INDICATIVE OF 
FUTURE RESULTS 
                                             John Cioffi* 
 
I come to the subject of Law and Development as something of an out-
sider.  My work in law and comparative political economy focuses on the 
advanced industrial countries,28 where rule of law issues are generally less 
salient and pressing (at least until recently).  That perspective, however, has 
informed my reaction to much of the Law and Development literature.  
First, as a conceptual and methodological matter, I note that the trend to-
wards large-n quantitative analyses of law-related variables and economic 
outcomes is deeply problematic; often, these studies lump together highly 
developed countries with a well-established rule of law with those in which 
the rule of law is as undeveloped as their economies.  Second, much of the 
literature builds on questionable but common assumptions about the rule of 
law, conceptually rooted in neo-liberalism and its presumptively beneficent 
relation to development in general, and certain classes of economic out-
comes in particular.  These assumptions elide critical questions about (1) 
the arguable necessity of the rule of law, at least in its neo-liberal guise, to 
successful economic development, and (2) the relation of the rule of law to 
the historically defined social and political context of legal rules and institu-
tions. 
As an initial matter, I regard the relation of law to economic and social 
development as a matter of enormous import and one in dire need of sus-
tained thoughtful inquiry.  Yet, I also join Anna Gelpern29 in avoiding the 
subject of whether Law and Development is a ―field‖ or not.  That question 
turns on definitional matters, on what constitutes a field, or a sub-field, or a 
discipline, etc.—definitions that are seldom resolved satisfactorily, let alone 
conclusively.  Such debates often provide academics with solid exercise, 
but ultimately lend themselves more to professional boundary policing, on-
tological combat (or stalemate), and methodological battles without end, ra-
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disciplines are littered with these types of disputes; they are seldom produc-
tive or edifying. 
Perhaps a more useful way to view Law and Development is from the 
perspective of why it has been resurrected, after the dispiriting failures of 
the original Law and Development movement of the 1960s, to become such 
a prominent and a seemingly inevitable subject of intellectual inquiry and 
policy activism.  This return strikes me as the product of a particular histor-
ical moment.  The renewed emphasis on rule of law and law reform issues 
in the developing world reflects the decline of more statist industrial poli-
cies, such as import substitution industrialization policies and state guided 
(or controlled) allocation of credit, common to the Japanese-inspired East 
Asian developmental model.  Statist and corporatist development strategies 
were often successful.30  However, they were hardly law-centric in their go-
vernance, nor did they use law to convey broad discretionary authority to 
public and/or private actors.  Statist strategies, even in successful industria-
lized countries like France and Japan, confronted diminishing returns over 
time.  Corruption and rent-seeking on a grand scale, though varying consi-
derably cross-nationally, helped to discredit statism further31—whether this 
discrediting was warranted across the board may now be a moot point.  One 
important casualty of the global economic crisis may well be export-driven 
growth models such as those deployed with notable success in East Asia. 
The diminution—and increasing distrust—of state activism, coupled 
with burgeoning globalization of trade and finance, left policymakers ever 
more reliant on markets as primary allocative mechanisms.  And markets 
require at least a basic legal infrastructure of rules, enforcement mechan-
isms, and functional legal institutions to operate efficiently.  To paraphrase 
Steven Vogel, freer markets require more rules.32  A brutal lesson of the 
current global economic crisis is that the increasing complexity and devel-
opment of a national economy compels the expansion and maintenance of 
more complex and well-administered legal, regulatory, and institutional 
frameworks. 
Conceptions of the rule of law rooted in neo-liberalism were poised to 
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This liberal vision of law and its role in ordering economic affairs has much 
to recommend it, but it suffers from at least two glaring problems.  First, the 
ideological biases of neo-liberalism toward regulatory minimalism intro-
duce a tension at the center of the law reform project.  Fears of legally-
enabled rent-seeking and efficiency-destroying juridification are at cross-
purposes with the need to develop strong autonomous legal institutions, 
codes, and standards suitably tailored to different national settings.  Second, 
and more important, is the neo-liberal tendency to frame law reform as 
something of a one-size-fits-all set of policies that can be imported without 
regard to extant socio-political conditions.  Establishing the rule of law, as a 
means of both constituting and delimiting state power, and as a means of 
establishing the ground rules for market-led growth, is intensely politicized 
and notoriously difficult.  (Indeed, much political and constitutional theory 
is devoted in some way to this core problem of law and politics.)  It is also 
an inherently case-specific process.34  Hence, large-scale comparative stu-
dies may give us some valuable information, but miss the central political 
economic dynamics that determine the juridical and material outcomes that 
concern us. 
The problem of determining ―what works,‖ as Katharina Pistor has 
called on us to do,35 is complicated by the paucity of reliable data.  Even in 
the United States, where legal and regulatory issues are politically sensitive 
and intensively studied, legal variables are notoriously difficult to measure, 
as are their effects on behavior.  The problem grows exponentially worse in 
less developed countries.  Accordingly, studies that are more qualitative and 
case-specific are likely to be most useful in informing us about the relation-
ships between law and economic behavior and the process by which the 
rule of law and reasonably efficient legal frameworks can be developed.  In 
this sense, I agree with John Ohnesorge that detailed sociological investiga-
tion is unavoidable.36  I would add to this the necessity of finer-grained in-
stitutional analysis that bridges economic and sociological theoretical 
approaches.  But, of course, what we gain in vividness and concrete under-
standing, we lose in generalizability.  I fully recognize how unsatisfying 
this conclusion is, but in a domain of scholarly inquiry and policymaking 
that so often seems in search of magic bullets (or perhaps magic weapons 
systems), a certain degree of disenchantment is inevitable. 
Finally, ―what works‖ is subject to substantial doubt and debate, even 
when substantive issues of social development (such as women’s rights) are 
left aside and we focus with hard head and shriveled heart on narrower me-
trics of economic growth.  For example, I speculated above that the export-
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and the likely long-term reduction in U.S. consumer demand (the global 
consumer of last resort for over two decades).  Hopefully, the bubble-driven 
growth model of the United States and many other developed countries in 
recent decades will also take its place on the scrap heap of history.  A fur-
ther victim of the crisis is the finance-centered vision of the firm and econ-
omy.  The vast literature on the legal requisites of financial globalization 
and its beneficial developmental role is premised on analytical assumptions 
regarding the long-term efficiency and optimizing influence of financial 
markets.  It also relies on economic data produced by an international fi-
nancial and economic order that is collapsing around us.  Caveat emptor, 
caveat legislator: Past performance is not indicative of future results. 
